ABSTRACT | Social function is one of the most thought-provoking principles governing contractual relationships. Based on this principle, contractual boundaries take on fluid contours, allowing them to adapt to social needs and expectations. With the new regulation of private relations, stemming from the Economic Freedom Act (Law 13.874/19), the economic aspects of the social function—already recognized in the 1988 Federal Constitution—have taken on special significance. This paper seeks to demonstrate how the individual and the social are called upon to move forward together in the new landscape of private relations.
KEYWORDS | Social function. Economic freedom. Civil Law.
ABSTRACT | The social function is one of the most instigating principles in contractual relations. In the social function, contractual limits become more fluid, in order to conform to social needs and expectations. With the new regulation of private relations, arising from the Economic Freedom Law (Law act 13.874/19), the economic characteristics of the social function, already covered in the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, gained special importance. This study seeks to demonstrate how the individual and the social aspects need to work together in the new universe of private relations.
KEYWORDS | Social function. Economic freedom. Civil Law.
To be objective, without beating around the bush, we must recognize that all existing legal systems have always been functional in nature (1). All law has a function, a purpose. It is inconceivable to structure a legal system without doing so to satisfy an interest or to protect a vital interest. Do not concern yourself with whether the purpose is just or not, or whether the system seeks to exalt humanity or to dismantle it. What matters is the fact that, always and at every moment, the law has had a purpose that characterizes it, whether it be to protect the King, the hierarchical caste system, the individual, the community, etc. As PERLINGIERI aptly explains,
subjective situations can also be considered from two perspectives: the functional and the normative or regulatory. The former is particularly important for identifying relevance, for characterizing the situation—that is, for determining its function within the realm of socio-legal relations. The Italian legal system assigns a social function to each subjective situation. The phenomenon may be more or less relevant; at times, it is so significant that it transforms the subjective situation itself. There are situations that “are” social functions, and others that “have” a social function. Within the legal system, an interest is protected to the extent that it serves not only the interest of the holder but also that of the community. In most cases, therefore, an interest gives rise to a complex subjective situation, composed of both powers and duties, obligations, and burdens. The complexity of subjective situations—in which every situation involves elements of power and duty, such that the distinction between active and passive situations should not be understood in an absolute sense—reflects the solidarity-based nature of our constitutional order. (2)
Today, in the face of environmental challenges, the scarcity of natural resources, and the decline of humanity, the legal system has turned its attention to the individual as a being embedded in society, thereby endowing subjective rights (and, by extension, objective rights) with social characteristics. Hence the discussion of “social function,” which, while an old concept in terms of function, introduces a new paradigm as a social concept.
Due to the idea of absolute rights—as some advocate regarding Roman property law—little discussion has taken place regarding the pluralistic nature of rights. Furthermore, when it came to the rights arising from obligations and contracts, the focus was on the perspective of the creditor or the debtor: one pole representing positive values, holding power and influence; the other, one of servitude and submission, at the mercy of the powers of the holder of the credit claim.
This view, which should be relegated to legal history for reference, has already been superseded by the understanding of the obligation as a process, and the contract has already transcended the binary framework, giving rise to contractual networks and complex contracts. The comparison serves, however, as a defining element of a clear shift in direction—a shift in the central paradigm, from the “master-individual” to the “cooperative person.” In the words of Orlando de Carvalho,
it is in this sense that the repersonalization of civil law is deemed appropriate—regardless of the framework within which that law is contained—that is, the emphasis on its anthropocentric root, on its visceral connection to the person and their rights. Without these roots, such a law is incomprehensible, not so much because the bulk of civil law institutions still rely solely on the autonomy of the will—at least in the form of freedom of contract—but mainly because civility or civilism is an idea that either no longer has any connection or has it precisely because it is the sphere of the person. Undoubtedly, this personalist orientation tends to permeate the entire world of law, emphasizing—both against relativism and against the transpersonalist notions that relativism has fostered (of the State, the Nation, and Race)—that law, while not a logical system, as conceptual jurisprudence claimed, is nonetheless an axiological system, an ethical system presided over by man as the first and most inalienable of values (3).
The creditor and the contracting party are no longer abstract entities but have become concrete, living beings—ethical beings engaged in society. A being who cries, who laughs, who is moved. Who experiences every moment as if the sunrise were the last; a being who recognizes and knows that there is not just one path to be taken, but an infinity of paths and setbacks that highlight its greatest value: the possibility of error. And this brings the “I” closer to the “we.” So much so that, as we shall see, the “we” came to take precedence over the “I.” The search for a system based on solidarity, however, led us to a stigmatizing understanding, in which function took on the character of content, dominating the very structure of rights. Worse still, a social overload began to take hold, to such an extent that the exercise of rights could be threatened by the irrationality of carrying out a contract or obligation in the face of the risks and costs involved in its realization.
We thus have a new law—reconceived and reinterpreted—in which the whole matters and defines the part; in which each part plays a vital role in constructing the whole. Not a reductionist law, in which the individual is lost in the whole or in which the whole must bow to the part. An agile, dignified law that enables the individual to express themselves in their entirety, to their fullest potential. The individual reflects the whole picture without losing their specificity, without being reduced or devalued.
The social functionalization of law becomes a recurring theme in legal mottos, making cooperation the system’s core value. One should not act in isolation; every action must inherently incorporate the concept of the other within the self. This can define the idea of social function: exercising a right within the bounds of one’s own benefit and that of others—to the extent that the right satisfies one’s claim without harming third parties. Gradually, a distortion of this concept emerged, in which the interests of others came to take precedence over one’s own. This was a negative development that needed to be addressed.
The understanding of the limited use of rights, in turn—which encompasses the concept of abuse of rights—was clearly outlined by the Civil Code in Article 187 and contributed significantly to justifying the social function, since it clearly worked in favor of both the whole and the individual. From this perspective, the concept of an unlawful act extends beyond the confines of conduct born on the fringes of the system only to be swept into the realm of legality, emerging from the legal sowing but growing like weeds that choke the wheat. What little legality remained in the act is lost in excessive conduct, laying bare the itches and ills that follow in its wake. It must be emphasized that one cannot conceive of a non-legal right, nor that abuse is embedded in the very structure of the law. On the contrary, the abuse lies with the individual—the party exercising the right—who oversteps boundaries and disregards the basic parameters of proportionality and necessity.
The theory of abuse of rights, originating in French law, has already taken shape, gaining, today, a degree of objectivity, from which emerges the perspective that the reason does not matter, but rather that harm has occurred. Subjectivity and fault are gradually giving way to the breaking down of barriers. As has already been stated, there is a shift from the tortious act to unjust harm (4).
It is the social function that reclaims the consideration, the return, or social payment. With regard to contracts, what is evident is a clear intent to structure the relationships so that each contracting party contributes a “plus” (not surplus value) to the system, thereby sustaining the structure. Each established contractual situation enables many others to arise, allowing a contractual network to take root within the social fabric, bringing people closer together—people who, in their sometimes selfish pursuit of self-gratification, ultimately come to recognize and see themselves reflected in their neighbor.
It is this figure of the other who becomes the center around which the law orbits. Not a neutral, distant, abstract other, but the one who is reflected in the self, the one who is also the self. The other is a multifaceted figure—various others who come together in a single obligational relationship, generating a network of obligations that validate the self, the other, and the “we.” And if this were always the case, everything would be fine. But we have clearly seen rules and formalities operate solely for the purpose of discouraging contracting; the increase in risks becomes prohibitive and impossible to share.
Note that emphasis must be placed on contractual networks—a common phenomenon today in which contracts and contracting parties are interconnected, such that each comes to directly influence the others, but within a legally structured symbiosis, in which each party necessarily needs the other to achieve its objective, even if it is not even aware of the other party’s existence. Indeed, contractual networks are a good example of the “depersonalization-repersonalization” (5) that the law of obligations in civil law has been undergoing. In the past, when entering into a contract, one was certain of who the counterpart—the complementary party—would be. In the current context, there is no longer complete certainty as to what is being contracted (see Articles 413 and 478 of the Civil Code of 2002), much less with whom one is contracting (as seen in the contract with a person to be named, Articles 467 et seq. of the Civil Code of 2002).
Allow me a brief digression here to explain why we speak of “depersonalization-repersonalization.” When rights and duties are structurally aligned without questioning “whose” or “for whom,” it is possible to foster greater interaction among those who otherwise would not enter into a contract. With depersonalization, what is taken into account are the characteristics of the party, not the individual behind it. The contracting party can accommodate all the needs of the individual with whom it enters into a contract and, furthermore, flexibly adapt the contractual terms to optimize the relationship. This is not a false-emancipatory discourse, in which one seeks to feign equality at the threshold of robotization. On the contrary, what is meant is the clear demonstration that, in the virtual universe of the contract, various weaknesses can be overcome, always in the best interest of the party who, in the real world, has physical, intellectual, and structural deficits.
This is achieved without abstracting the real subject, since the basic essence remains uniform and centralized. A minimal personal element remains at the core of the concept. Hence, what we observe is that the individual, as a party, can adapt their existence to overcome their limitations. And it was necessary to place greater emphasis on this personal space—a space that is truly individual.
This fantastic phenomenon made possible by the current contractual perspective brings new problems, the legal answers to which are still in their infancy. One can list contracts via the World Wide Web, in which there is no subject beneath the guise of the “party”; on the contrary, there is a second layer: the “nick (6),” an identification key, “IP (7),” or any other data through which human identity on the Internet can be summarized. A new world that grapples with concepts rooted in the nineteenth century or the early twentieth century, among them the social function.
This social function, once a matter of uncertain understanding, now finds itself navigating new (more stable?) waters, which we will now analyze.
2. BOW TO STARBOARD: WHAT WATERS AWAIT US?
This is not only the most important part of this article, but we can even assume that, if read on its own, it is the message we intend to convey. The sections preceding and following this one may be set aside for another time, when the reader has more time. Their sole purpose is to foster a deeper understanding and to accept responsibility for the conclusions that will be drawn here. Dear reader, please accept our apologies, and as compensation for having read this far, we advise you that you may choose to postpone the final section. However, if you enjoyed the first part, please read on to the end to have the whole story in your hands.
Legal doctrine has always maintained—with rare exceptions—that the social function enshrined in the Constitution has an economic framework, designed to meet the socioeconomic expectations that the people surrounding the contracting parties, property owners, or businesspeople placed on their conduct.
However, sweeping aside any previous debate on the matter, the Economic Freedom Act (LLE), in addition to redefining property rights, established an intellectual and interpretive framework for the world of contracts, affecting good faith and the social function. We will now address the latter.
First, we must understand the rationale behind this new interpretive framework. Article 1, paragraph 1, of the LLE establishes that the provisions of the law shall be observed in the application and interpretation of civil, business, economic, urban planning, and labor law in legal relationships falling within its scope of application and in public policy, including the practice of professions, commerce, commercial registries, public records, traffic, transportation, and environmental protection.
The LLE did not establish a microsystem; rather, it operates in a “microbial” manner, interacting with elements already present in the (macro) system and giving them a (more) clearly economic framework. It is a mechanism that stems from the very core of each category and must be present in the very act of reading and decoding the rights and duties across various spheres, notably (given the purpose of this article) civil and contractual law.
As both Carlos MAXIMILIANO and Pietro PERLINGIERI remind us, although basic decoding is not sufficient to grasp the true scope of a legal provision, it is the first step in any interpretive activity. Without first understanding what is written—without reaching the level of intellection (understanding, bringing it to the intellect)—it is not possible to proceed in any interpretive direction. And, once we reach the stage of intellectual grasp, we begin to apprehend the concrete meaning of the norm, which means that different intellectual perspectives will give rise to different interpretive nuances.
And now, in the final stage of understanding the norm/rule/postulate/principle, we must note that the new perspective established by the LLE regarding the social function of contracts is set forth in Article 113, §1, V, as follows:
(...) 1. The interpretation of a legal transaction must attribute to it the meaning that (...)
V—corresponds to what would constitute a reasonable negotiation between the parties regarding the matter in question, as inferred from the other provisions of the transaction and the parties’ economic rationality, taking into account the information available at the time of its execution.
And from this point forward, we will focus on understanding the framework established by this subparagraph. First, however, let us pause briefly to consider the Economic Analysis of Law and the economic rationality of the parties.
Although some disagree with the actual influence of economic thought on the law, in the realm of contracts it is difficult—if not impossible—to disregard this relationship. The concept of a contract is based on economic rationality, the assessment of externalities, and the allocation of risks.
Those who advocate for the Economic Analysis of Law (hereinafter EAL) tend to consider that one of the areas in which economists and legal scholars would supposedly have the fewest disagreements is precisely the area of contract law, especially when contracts are entered into between private parties (8).
But in a system grounded in solidarity and based on human dignity, wouldn’t it be a contradiction to understand that the law is established on a foundation of economic rationality? Wouldn’t that be to make legal relationships overly rigid and relegate the human element to the background? There is no need for further debate. These lines do not constitute a profession of faith in favor of EAL; rather, the aim is to use economic concepts as a starting point to understand how a mind can form an agreement based on economic rationality. And to do so, we will draw on the lessons of POSNER:
Those who are not economists tend to associate economics with money, capitalism, selfishness, a narrow and unrealistic conception of human motivation and behavior, a formidable mathematical apparatus, and a penchant for cynical, pessimistic, and conservative conclusions. Economics earned the nickname “dark science” because of Thomas Malthus’s thesis, according to which famine, war, and sexual abstinence were the only ways to balance population and food supply. The essence of economics has nothing to do with these things, however. The essence is extremely simple, even if that simplicity is deceptive. What is simple can be subtle; it may not be intuitive; its antithesis is “complicated,” not “difficult.” Most economic analysis consists of tracing the consequences that arise from assuming that people are more or less rational in their social interactions (9).
Attempting to explain how economic rationality is part of business thinking is a limited exercise, one that we can illustrate with a simple example. In 2010, during the drilling of the Gastau gas pipeline, Petrobras decided to abandon a tunnel boring machine (a drill), purchased for 51 million reais, in a section of the tunnel that had already been excavated, since dismantling the machine and transporting it out of the tunnel would have delayed the project by 104 days. As a result, Petrobras claims to have achieved savings of 700 million reais compared to the option of dismantling and removal. This is the kind of rationality observed in business agreements and that must be observed in all contracts of an economic nature. Of course, this line of reasoning would not apply to a donation or a mandate granted out of friendship; however, as noted, it is what should guide the interpreter in analyzing contracts conceived on an economic basis.
And how would the social function be reconceived in light of these intellectual and interpretive perspectives presented here? Not only would the nature of the social function be established on economic grounds, but its entire scope would come to have as its purpose the maximization of efficiency, the prevention or mitigation of externalities, and the guidance of risk distribution.
As has always been the case, on the scales of social function, the individual remains on one side and society on the other; however, the balance must now tip in favor of respecting the expectations and calculations that the individual has incorporated into the agreements and contracts they enter into. While, on the one hand, the contract must produce the effects expected by society (upholding the essential nature of the contractual cause), the interpreter cannot impose a solution on the case that disregards the economic rationality upon which the agreement was built. Would this mean that we are taking a step backward in favor of selfishness and speculation; that “drawer contracts” (condemned for their lack of social function) would return to the scene? No, such a conclusion, being hasty, is flawed and distorts reality. The aim is to demonstrate that, within the bounds of legality, the deadlines, conditions, and terms established by the parties in the agreement must be respected—and indeed, precisely because of its social function—since, now, in addition to serving the majority, it gives voice to and listens to the smallest minority: the individual (to paraphrase the writer Ayn Rand). The individual who wishes to act, undertake, plan, produce, and distribute within a rational framework—one that interweaves not just a few, but even hundreds of agreements that must be recognized and respected so that the whole system functions.
This relationship between the individual and the social function may still seem unclear, or worse, may even appear contradictory to some. But it is not. Social function has long invoked two major principles regarding contractual protection: on the one hand, it shielded the relationship involving the actions of third parties (third-party aggressors) while simultaneously preventing that relationship from affecting the legal sphere of other people (third-party victims). When this protection failed, the civil liability system was invoked, as seen in the case of the bystander, as provided for in Article 17 of the CDC. As can be seen from this brief overview, social function has never been a static factor, but rather one that influences all subjective rights, both by giving them a necessary purpose and by imposing limits on them. Our analysis here does not discuss limits, but rather assesses the current direction to be expected from such functionalization.
There is no exaggeration on the part of the Legislature nor any action contrary to the Federal Constitution, as it did not act to remove the social function from private relations. Much less did it establish a shift in orientation. On the contrary, it refined the controls, clearly defined the guiding principle, leaving no doubt now regarding economic functionalization, and affirming that economic rationality must be weighed by those who interpret and apply the law. There is no unconstitutionality when the infraconstitutional legislator fills the space left to it by the Constituent Assembly, precisely defining rights or rules established generically by the latter.
And how should this entire issue be addressed in the contract? To this end, we must bear in mind that the Economic Freedom Act establishes a declaration of the rights inherent to individuals and legal entities that are necessary for the establishment of a state of economic freedom.
The foundation upon which these rights are built is Article 170 of the Federal Constitution, which must always be kept in mind as a guiding principle for interpretation. Similarly, the purpose of these rights is Brazil’s economic development and growth. This is fundamental to understanding how these freedoms align with the creation of a broad and free market; furthermore, while these freedoms primarily exist between citizens and the State, they will also affect—as can be seen in the disregard for legal personality—relationships between private parties. Indirectly, yes; to a lesser extent, yes. But such relationships will also be taken into account to ensure the realization of a space of freedom.
First Right—Freedom to Engage in Low-Risk Activities – It is the right of citizens and legal entities to engage in low-risk economic activities, for which they may rely exclusively on their own private property or that of consenting third parties, without the need for any public authorization of the economic activity (Art. 3, I)
Second right—Not to be taxed or charged at a higher rate based on operating days and hours – This right, established in Article 3, II, of the LLE, does not apply to environmental regulations (such as those prohibiting noise pollution), labor regulations (such as night shift premiums and premiums for work on non-business days), or those arising from private relationships, such as condominium rules. On this point, it is clear that intervention in private relationships is guided by respect for agreements and arrangements, provided they do not conflict with mandatory rules and human rights. In reality, the LLE reinforces the scope of private-law freedom—as it should be known—providing an important guiding principle for those who interpret and apply the law.
Third Right—Free Pricing in Unregulated Markets—In a free market, supply and demand serve as the barometers for price setting. Price control measures are possible and, in extreme situations, necessary; however, it must be borne in mind that such measures are invariably accompanied by supply crises and the need for intervention by state law enforcement to prevent products from disappearing from the market. It is important to balance price freedom with consumer protection. It is not the State’s role to set product prices (except in the cases noted above); rather, it is the State’s role to act when there are tied sales or practices that exploit consumers’ good faith.
Fourth right—To receive equal treatment from public administration agencies and entities—This right prevents arbitrary decision-making by the public administration in decisions necessary for the authorization of an activity. The concept of precedent becomes important for resolving issues related to operating permits, licenses, etc., and also creates a mechanism for citizens to exercise oversight over the actions of the Administration, since an exception granted in favor of a favored party may be invoked as an interpretive framework.
Fifth right—Presumption of good faith and freedom as an interpretive framework for subjective good faith—The fifth item of Article 3 of Law 13.874/19 establishes that citizens have the right to enjoy a presumption of good faith in acts performed in the course of economic activity, for which doubts regarding the interpretation of civil, business, economic, and urban planning law shall be resolved in a manner that preserves private autonomy, unless there is an express legal provision to the contrary. The fact is that in the private law sphere—that is, in civil and business law—subjective good faith is already presumed, and the burden of proving bad faith falls on the party making the allegation, as Cesare Vivante’s writings remind us. In other areas, there is also significant legislative support for good faith. However, what stands out is the novel interpretive approach to good faith itself, which must be grounded in economic freedom. We already know that the social function enshrined in the Federal Constitution of Brazil (CFRB) has always had an economic slant, but now good faith, too, is being given a special functional role in favor of the market and the freedom to operate within it.
Sixth right—The right to innovate—Innovating, anywhere in the world, is a challenge. Innovating when the legal system fails, even minimally, to keep pace with emerging developments (consider, for example, today’s intense debate over the succession of digital rights, which is far removed from the legislature’s interests), creates an insurmountable obstacle for any citizen seeking to introduce new mechanisms or innovative methods into the market. Naturally, this freedom is tied to the protection of the health and well-being of consumers and the population as a whole. It is still too early to discuss the true scope of this new rule, but time will reveal just how open our country will be to innovation.
Seventh Right—The Right to Broad Autonomy of Will—Business relationships are now governed by the fundamental principle of the parties’ autonomy of will in stipulating their agreements. Legal rules—with the exception of mandatory provisions—should be regarded as merely supplementary; the interpreter should first rely on the terms established between the parties, then on what can be inferred from the spirit of the agreement, and finally on the legal rules. Although there is no explicit mention of this “spirit of the agreement,” once the parties’ will is elevated to a new level, the presumption of the “potential intent of the parties” must also be considered by those interpreting and applying the law.
Eighth Right—The Right to a Reasonable Duration of Administrative Proceedings and the Presumption in the Citizen’s Favor—Upon completion of the submission of all requested documents, the citizen is entitled to two rights: (I) the right to a specified timeframe for the resolution of their claim; and (II) unless expressly prohibited by law, the presumption that the citizen’s request will be accepted in the event of failure to meet the deadline.
Ninth right – Freedom of archiving – which may be carried out via microfilming or digital means, in accordance with future regulations.
Tenth right – Protection against the imposition of abusive compensatory or mitigating measures – This right does not preclude the imposition of measures to compensate for or reduce the environmental or urban impact of an activity; what is now explicitly prohibited is the abuse of such requirements. Subsection XI lists situations that exemplify such abuse: requiring a measure that was already planned for implementation prior to the private party’s request, without the economic activity altering the need for implementation of said measure; using the private party to carry out actions that offset impacts that would exist regardless of the project or the requested economic activity; requiring the implementation or provision of any kind for areas or situations beyond those directly impacted by the economic activity; or be unreasonable or disproportionate, including when used as a means of coercion or intimidation; and the direct or indirect public administration shall not require a certificate unless expressly provided for by law.
A new social function is introduced, grounded in the general interest, yet with full respect for the interests of those who have put themselves on the line and taken risks. It safeguards the social good, yet does not overlook the needs of those who keep the wheels turning. It protects without stifling. This is the new reconfiguration of the social function: social concern viewed through an individual lens.
3. DOCKING, BUT ALREADY PREPARING THE SHIP FOR DEPARTURE
Land in sight. Hoist the sails. Drop the anchors. Unfortunately, this is only a brief stop, for our purpose in these writings is not to reassure, but to provoke. To spark debate about the major implications embedded in the Economic Freedom Law. Recently, Brazilian Civil Law has received important contributions that are sometimes overlooked or not fully understood in all their scope. We cannot allow this to happen with the Economic Freedom Law. Alongside the redefinition of the social function discussed here, good faith and the real right to property itself have also been revisited by the legislature, taking on an air of individualization—which is nothing more than an echo of the repersonalization enshrined in the 1988 Federal Constitution.
We must now be clear that protecting the individual is not a self-serving agenda, much less a maneuver that weakens efforts to protect minorities. On the contrary, when we emphasize the need to respect the individual, we give them a voice of their own; we allow them to speak for themselves and even choose to speak alongside the social group. Autonomy and emancipation are necessities in today’s world, which is becoming faster, more connected, and more fluid by the day, leaving the individual with the choice of either getting lost in the crowd or raising their voice to demand respect for their interests.
Although solidarity is an urgent need, it must be noted that there will be no sharing if people feel discouraged from producing; there will be no contract if the parties cannot have their legitimate intentions respected; there will be no circulation if there is no wealth to circulate.
A new era is dawning, in which the social and the individual will come to respect one another and walk side by side, so as to conceive of a more just society that always has its sights set on the progress of all.
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ON THE SEXTANTS—OR UNDERSTANDING THE BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES
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(1) Duguit considers “objective law” to be a “law of purpose,” in the sense of the realization of “social solidarity” (...) The idea of purpose is not an end external to humankind; it is immanent to humankind living in society, implying a process of externalization and internalization, for ‘the act of human will appears as a bodily movement that is the product of the subject’s internal energy, manifesting itself consciously outwardly with a view to an end to be attained, and conditioning a series of unconscious events that follow one another according to a certain law.’ FARIAS. op. cit. pp. 225–227.
(2) PERLINGIERI, Pietro. Perfis do Direito Civil, pp. 106-7.
(3) CARVALHO, Orlando. Para uma teoria da relação jurídica civil – a teoria geral da relação jurídica – seu sentido e limites. v. I. Coimbra (PT): Centelha. 1981.pp.90-1.
(4) For this, see BODIN, in Danos à pessoa humana, pp. 177 ff.
(5) Here, we start from the idea of repersonalization, a phenomenon recognized by many as a means rather than an end. The term “depersonalization-repersonalization” denotes the idea of destruction-reconstruction, or perhaps better, mutation. The sign is destroyed, reshaped, and remade, acquiring not only a new form but also a new meaning. It is a dynamic concept, in which, for repersonalization to occur, the depersonalization of relationships has, prima facie, taken place.
(6) Abbreviation for “nickname.” A form of identification that allows users to maintain anonymity.
(7) Internet Protocol, a common data transfer protocol that connects computers to the global network. This number identifies the machine as a mailbox, to use an old-fashioned analogy.
(8) MONROY CELY, Daniel Alejandro. Análisis Económico de la buena fe en el derecho de contratos, p. 56
(9) POSNER, Richard A. El movimiento del analísis económico del Derecho: desde Bentham hasta Becker. Themis 44, p. 39-40.